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The paradox of psychiatric stigma:
similar or different, blame or fear
‘If only I could use this to show people that there really was
something different about my brain, my life would be so
much easier’ - this was the recent reaction of a service user
with a history of severe depression to a presentation of
magnetic resonance imaging (MRI) images highlighting
particularities of the depressed brain. He had experienced
discrimination because his condition was viewed not as
legitimate illness, but ‘weakness and malingering’, and he
expressed a common desire for something to demonstrate a
physical difference accompanying mental illness - to display
an objective reason for his symptoms, outside of his control.
Prejudice against him seems rooted in ideas that he is too
weak, lazy, selﬁsh or devoid of willpower to manage the
challenges of life like others, despite being, fundamentally,
the same. Meanwhile, there is an important theme within
anti-stigma work to emphasise the normality, prevalence
and universality of mental illness, in the hope that stressing
likeness and commonality will lead to a reduction in public
fear and alienation.
Stigma is deﬁned as ‘a mark of disgrace’ or as a
distinguishing negative token. Thornicroft, for example,
calls it ‘a characteristic that individuals possess (or are
believed to possess) that conveys a social identity that is
devalued, or a mark of disgrace associated with a particular
circumstance, quality, or person’ (p. 9ff ) and explains how it
engenders prejudicial beliefs, which lead to discriminatory
behaviour.1 The idea of ‘otherness’ is central to psychiatric
stigma. Yet my example shows a victim of discrimination
actually suggesting that a substantive marker of difference
could potentially reverse prejudice. It seems that, for some,
psychiatric stigma cannot be eradicated by simply convincing
people that mental illness involves no fundamental difference.
So we have a perplexing paradox - stigma appears to stem
from two opposing beliefs that those with mental illness are
both different and also not actually different. Although
there may be no simple solution to the problem of
psychiatric stigma, a conceptual framework for explaining
this central paradox might at least shed some light on the
difﬁculties.
Although clearly multifaceted and complex, psychiatric
stigma is also full of puzzling contradictions. It still appears
that fear on the one hand and blame on the other dominate
discriminatory attitudes towards mental illness. We ﬁnd
ourselves stuck between a rock and a hard place, where
decreasing one stigmatising attitude may inadvertently
increase another. Biomedical models might reduce blame
and promote treatment,2-4 but they can increase perceptions
of danger, desire for social distance and acceptance of more
coercive treatment measures.5-9 Stressing afﬁnity or
psychosocial factors risks further alienating those with
more severe mental illness, minimising the problems they
face and taking us full circle back to the idea of mental
illness as an inability to manage the stresses and challenges
of life, resulting from weakness of personality, moral
strength or self-control (not to mention the concomitant
dangers of over-pathologising and medicating ‘ordinary’
stress reactions).10,11
In this journal, Kingdon argued that even ideas like
the one in four mantra do not sufﬁciently highlight
commonality, and recommended replacing ‘mental disorder’
with a more ‘socially inclusive’ stress continuum model of
mental illnesses as extreme variants of reaction to stresses
faced by everybody.12 In response, Braithwaite13 maintains
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that the ‘medicalisation of stress belittles major mental
illness’ and that there is no convincing evidence that a
number of major mental illnesses are any more likely to be
triggered by psychosocial stress than numerous physical
conditions. Stigma, he argues, will not be eradicated by
simply reconceptualising an illness to remove any biome-
dical distinguishing factors. Indeed, portraying major
mental disorder as part of a normal stress continuum may
actually increase stigma by belittling serious medical
conditions.13 For Kingdon, to defeat stigma, we must
emphasise afﬁnity and ‘normality’; for Braithwaite, differ-
ence and ‘disorder’. However, a subsequent report suggests
that choosing a ‘stressed’ or ‘ill’ model makes very little
difference to public perception.14 As the authors point out,
even a stress model leaves the difﬁcult question of why
‘ ‘‘normal’’ mentally ill people react differently to stressful
events which the majority of people can deal with?’
Even if it seems tempting to downplay difference, this
can be a risky strategy. If we suggest that mental illness is
not substantively different from ordinary experience, how can
we explain and understand its debilitating consequences
without recourse to some type of moral judgement?
Moreover, what about symptoms and behaviours to
which others cannot relate? Presenting mental illness as
purely an extreme variant of ordinary behaviour might
engender greater misunderstanding and suspicion
surrounding symptoms which cannot be explained
accordingly. A blogger from the Time to Change website
comments on psychosis: ‘Telling someone you have a mental
illness is one thing. Telling them it’s Bipolar is another.
Telling them you hear voices, see people who aren’t there
and occasionally feel them touching you on the side of your
face is quite another thing entirely’.15 Another blogger, a
woman with schizophrenia, talks about interceding on
behalf of a man ‘being almost thrown out of a local coffee
shop for looking a bit eccentric when he was unwell’. By
comparing mental illness to a physical problem such as a
broken limb, she could explain how the owner was being
discriminatory and have the unwell man accepted. Without
recourse to explanations involving illness and difference,
the man would remain ostracised for abnormal, but
controllable, behaviour.16
Equally, it is often assumed that downplaying difference
will help people with mental illness to accept themselves.
Metseagharun, writing in support of Kingdon’s argument,
says ‘it is of course less bruising to anyone’s ego to accept
having a difﬁculty (or stress) than to accept having a
disorder (an implicit indication of socially undesirable or
deviant behaviour)’.17 But why should this be the case?
When someone faces ﬁnancial ruin after a manic episode or
ﬁnds themselves unable to work or function, plagued by
delusions, anxieties or depression, why would it be
reassuring to believe that the cause of these devastating
problems was essentially their own inability in coping with
stress? Conversely, a medical understanding may often
help those with mental illness reach acceptance, ﬁnd
treatment and gain more control: ‘accepting and gaining
insight of my illness has enriched my life’, comments a Time
to Change blogger;18 another blogger understands his
condition as similar to his hay fever: conditions which
require medication and ‘won’t go away of their own
accord’.18-20
Towards a likeness-based and unlikeness-based
conception of stigma
The stigma debate must contend with such puzzling
difﬁculties.21 Although increasing awareness and under-
standing are generally agreed to be crucial to battling
stigma and discrimination, current initiatives still struggle
(pp. 243-245).1 For example, the UK Time to Change
campaign, despite its achievements, has failed so far to fulﬁl
signiﬁcantly its key aim to improve knowledge or behaviour
among the general public.22
If we are want to promulgate knowledge or institute
policy changes to reverse structural discrimination, without
engendering negative assumptions, perhaps we need a
clearer understanding of such misunderstandings and
contradictions. It is here that a conceptual framework,
which explicates psychiatric stigma as not just multi-
dimensional or complex, but inherently paradoxical, might
help. As previously mentioned, stigma stems from notions
of otherness. With psychiatric stigma, however, the two
major kinds of difference believed to differentiate the
mentally ‘ill’ and ‘healthy’ seem to be in direct opposition,
their being based on converse notions of unlikeness and
likeness. Many people with mental illness will have
experienced both types of prejudice, even from the same
sources, despite apparent self-contradiction.
Unlikeness-based stigma is probably the more easily
understood, with mental illness seen as making people
intrinsically different, somehow ‘alien’ and thus easily
feared, ridiculed or restrained. Yet, although we may fear
those whom we see as different, those who cannot be
understood, predicted or controlled, it would seem illogical
to apportion blame for actions or behaviour unless we
believe the agent to share common ground and equal
capacities as ourselves for acting differently.
The root of attitudes such as blame may lie in stigma
based on another equally disturbing view, which we might
term likeness-based stigma and which stems from the idea
of similarity and a view of mental illness as inﬁrmity of
character rather than legitimate illness. Whereas unlikeness-
based prejudice suggests that mental illness is a defect in
the very qualities which deﬁne a normal human being,
likeness-based stigma implies a problem that is moral rather
than substantive or biological - that those with mental
illness share the same biological and environmental factors
as others, but lack the strength of character to deal with
them. Because, however one looks at it, mental illness, like
any health condition, sets aside those who experience it
from those who do not. In the absence of other
explanations, on the likeness-based model, people may
well construe the differences in behaviours and experiences
as stemming from some type of moral inferiority.
Examples of likeness-based stigma
Much anti-stigma work focuses on unlikeness-based stigma,
even though likeness-based stigma can be seen to be
extremely prevalent and signiﬁcant.
EDITORIALS
Gergel Dualism of psychiatric stigma
149
Although perceptions of mental illness vary in different
societies and cultures, the view that the individual is in
some way to blame for their condition is very common. In
Shunned, Thornicroft has suggested that a perceived lack of
willpower and notion of blame may even be the one thing
which comes close to being a unifying global feature
(pp. 176-179).1 He lists some common myths particular to
mental illness and derived from real experiences of
discrimination (p. 187).1 Although the idea of fundamental
difference is very much at the heart of views such as ‘all
schizophrenics are dangerous and violent’, many other
beliefs point towards a ‘likeness-based’ view that people
with mental illness are fundamentally the same, but lazy,
weak or incapable, and therefore responsible and blame-
worthy for their condition: ‘depression results from
personality weakness or character ﬂaw, and people could
snap out if they tried harder’; the mentally ill are ‘lazy and
not trying’; ‘mental illness is brought on by weakness of
character’; ‘if you have a mental illness, you can will it away,
and being treated for a psychiatric disorder means you have
in some way failed or are weak’; ‘psychiatric disorders are
not true medical illnesses like diabetes’.1
Nor are such ideas restricted to private contexts.
Discrimination by mental health professionals remains
widespread23 and service users often ﬁnd themselves
being held responsible for their conditions. An example is
a common experience for service users, known as diagnostic
overshadowing, which could be understood to stem from
similar attitudes. This occurs when ‘physical illness signs
and symptoms are misattributed to psychiatric disorder’, so
that physical symptoms appear to be judged as either
psychological in origin or of exaggerated severity, and which
may result in a lack of appropriate medical attention.24-26
Reﬂected here is an underlying attitude that psychiatric
patients faced with ordinary challenges lack the moral
strength to tolerate them as well as others do and are
therefore in some way blameworthy or responsible for their
symptoms and behaviours.
A couple of examples reveal that similar ideas can also
be found within academic medicine. A 2009 British Journal
of Psychiatry editorial on the moral content of psychiatric
treatment argues that ‘psychiatric treatment can enhance
human morality’ and that ‘helping patients to be more
virtuous is a proper concern of psychiatry’.27 The same
authors subsequently argue elsewhere that for conditions
such as depression, willpower to change behaviour has a
crucial and direct effect on the condition itself - ‘patients
must decide to behave differently and have the will to do it’
- whereas medical interventions, even in the case of
depression, are presented as secondary means to ‘bolster
resolve and willpower’.28 They sharply differentiate these
from conditions such as diabetes or cancer, where willpower
only affects factors such as adherence to treatment.28 In a
very different context, Schlaepfer et al,29 in response to
concerns that deep brain stimulation might affect person-
ality, state that, for psychiatric conditions, ‘modiﬁcation of
mood and cognitive behaviour - and thus important
elements of personality - is not an unwanted, coincidental
side effect, but rather the main intended outcome.’29
Although it is hard to imagine a psychiatric intervention
underpinned by a more neurological model than psychiatric
neurosurgery, the authors still seem to conﬂate alterations
in mood and cognitive behaviour caused by treatment-
resistant major depression or obsessive-compulsive
disorder with the service user’s personality and see
treatment in terms of modiﬁcation of personality. Without
intending to suggest prejudice in either set of authors or
that this brief discussion reﬂects the full complexity of the
authors’ ideas, both pieces lend themselves to the idea that
mental illness is, to a signiﬁcant degree, constituted by
defects of personality or morality in individuals, and that
the aim of psychiatric treatment is to rectify these
weaknesses, rather than to treat an illness viewed as
independent from the true personality of the affected
individual.
What are the implications?
Highlighting the importance of likeness-based stigma does
not mean that an unlikeness-based view of mental illness as
abnormal, alien and to be feared is not a prevalent and
major cause of discrimination. Such attitudes are all too
clear in recent examples such as the ‘mental patient’
and ‘psycho ward’ outﬁts withdrawn from two major
supermarket chains30 and the controversy over the
sensationalising and inaccurate article in a major tabloid
on numbers of people killed by ‘mental patients’.31
However, we should not also undervalue apparent
beneﬁts of illness models which entail ‘difference’ or assume
that the solution is simply to hide or de-emphasise
uncomfortable aspects of mental disorder.32 For example,
illness models seem to have generated an increase in
willingness to seek treatment, whereas major progress against
structural discrimination, such as the decriminalisation of
suicide, appears largely to have resulted from ofﬁcial
recognition of suicide as stemming predominantly from
mental illness. Moreover, stress continuum, prevalence or
recovery models could lead to decreased public spending on
health services, through viewing the service user as
primarily responsible for their own recovery.33
The formulation of psychiatric stigma as presented
here suggests that it emerges from two perspectives on
those with mental illness that appear to be paradoxically
opposed. This would seem to pose an immense difﬁculty for
anti-stigma campaigns. Highly sophisticated messages and
interventions have been developed in this ﬁeld, but I
suggest that there might be value in thinking through the
implications of the paradox. Key questions would then be: if
one accepts that there are important differences between
the experiences and behaviours of people with a mental
illness and the rest of the population, how can the negative
evaluations of those differences be challenged? And, given
that these negative evaluations may well remain negative,
for most of the differences would not be deemed desirable if
given the choice, how can the link between these negative
evaluations and stigma be broken?
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